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Leading Articles
Corporate Distributions of Appreciated
Property-A Comment on Policy
John E. North*
The Government's hard fought victories in Commissioner v.
Hirshon Trust,1 and Commissioner v. Godley's Estate2 were short
lived. Premature suggestions to-the contrary notwithstanding,
3 it
is now palpably clear that the 1954 Internal Revenue Code pre-
cludes the application of Hirshon and Godley after June 22, 1954; 4
and their application prior to that time has recently been foreclosed
by a retroactive amendment to the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.5
With the passing of Hirshon and Godley, the Revenue Code of 1954
has opened up a new area in the field of corporate distributions with
apparent tax savings potential.
I. THE BASIC CHANGE.
The impact of the 1954 Code in this area may best be illus-
trated by a simple example. The X corporation, having $10,000
current and accumulated earnings and profits, distributed to its
shareholders B corporation stock, having an adjusted basis of $5,000
and a fair market value of $15,000. The X corporation is not a
stock broker and the distribution is not in liquidation or redemp-
tion. The five-fold tax consequences of this transaction under the
1939 code and the changes effected by the 1954 Code, are the fol-
lowing:
* LL.B. 1948, Creighton University; LL.M. 1949, Duke University; Law
Clerk to James A. Donohoe, U.S. District Judge (Nebr.) 1950-1955; pres-
ently Professor of Law, Creighton University.
1 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861.
2 213 F.2d 529 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862.
3 Wren, The Income Taxation of Corporate Distributions Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 268, 274 (1955); §
1.316-1(a) (2),(3), 19 F.R. 8894 (Dec. 11, 1954).
4T.D. 6152, § 1.316-1(a) (2), (3) 20 F.R. 8894 (Dec. 3, 1955); Andrews,
Out of Its Earnings and Profits, Some Reflections on the Taxation of Div-
idends, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1409 (1956); Peterson, Corporate Distri-
butions and Adjustments-Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 30 Notre Dame Law. 191, 197-204 (1955); Mintz and Plumb, The
Thunderbolts and the New Look, 10 Tax L. Rev. 41, 405 (1954-1955).
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1. Effect on Corporate Income. The corporation would not
realize any income by the distribution. It was well settled judicially
prior to 1954 that a corporation realized no gain or loss upon the
declaration and distribution of a dividend in property. In 1954
Congress gave statutory recognition to this general principle but
provided three exceptions to prevent tax avoidance.1
2. The Extent of the Dividend. Under the Hirshon-Godley
interpretation of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, the shareholders
would be recipients of a taxable dividend equal to the fair market
value of the property received which was $15,000 in the example
given.8 However, under the 1954 Code only $10,000 would be con-
sidered a taxable dividend since that is the extent of the corporate
earnings and profits.9
With inconsequential variations in language both the 1939 and
1954 Codes defined "dividend" in terms of a distribution made by
a corporation to its shareholders out of its earnings or profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913 or out of earnings or profits
of the taxable year.10 Thus, at first blush, it would seem that the
Hirshon-Godley interpretation of the earlier code would be equally
applicable to the later one." However, the legislative history of
the 1954 Code discloses that both the House and Senate intended to
reject the Hirshon-Godley rule. The examples contained in the
Committee Reports are too clear to permit doubt. The House Ways
and Means Committee's detailed discussion of the House version of
the Bill contains this illustration:
If the fair market value of property at the time of distribution
was $150 and the earnings and profits of the distributing corpora-
tion, immediately prior to the distribution were $120, the amount
taxable as a dividend under 301 and 312 (a) would be $120.00.12
A similar illustration is contained in the Senate Finance Com-
mittee's detailed discussion of the Senate version of the bill.13 It is
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311, 70 Stat. 404, 26 U.S.C.A. p. 46 (Supp. 1956).
6 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200(1935);
Commissioner v. Columbia Pacific Shipping Co., 77 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.
1935). Distinguish: Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1948), involving an anticipatory assignment of income.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311.
s Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954); Com-
missioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529 (3rd Cir. 1954).
9 T.D. 6152, note 4 supra.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 316, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a).
"1 Wren, note 3 supra at 274.
12 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A94 (1954).
13 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1954).
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little wonder that the final regulations issued by the Treasury De-
partment accept this position and reject the Hirshon-Godley ap-
proach.1 4 That this was the object of the 1954 act is emphasized by
the legislative history of the 1956 retroactive amendment to sub-
section (n) of Section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
which was intended to overrule, legislatively, the Hirshon and
Godley decisions. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the
amendment contains the following comment:
Subsection (n) does no more than conform the law to the gen-
eral understanding of what it was prior to the Hirshon and Godley
decisions. Such understanding was based on the decisions in Gen-
eral Utilities and Operating Company v. Helvering (296 U.S. 200,
(1935)), Commissioner v. Timken (141 F2d 625 (C.C.A. 6, 1944)),
and a series of Tax court decisions. At the present time the Tax
Court still does not follow the Hirshon and Godley decisions.
Since the statute of limitations will, in most cases, prevent the as-
sessment of deficiencies resulting from application of the Hirshon
and Godley decisions, and since distributions made after the effec-
tive date of the 1954 Code will not be affected by those decisions,
your committee believes that it is inequitable, except in special
cases, to apply the decisions in the limited areas which remain
open.'r (Emphasis added.)
3. Effect on Corporate Earnings and Profits. The 1939 Code
did not expressly provide what adjustment would have to be made
in corporate earnings and profits where a corporation made a dis-
tribution of appreciated property as in the example under con-
sideration. Nor did the decided cases adequately dispose of the
problem. The authorities were consistent in holding that the cur-
rent and accumulated earnings were not to be increased by the
amount of appreciation inhering in the distributed property.16 But
these authorities do not bear upon the question of how much the
corporate earnings should be reduced by the distribution. Where
depreciated property was distributed, the cases held that the cor-
porate earnings should be reduced only by the adjusted basis of
the property distributed.1 7 On the other hand, where appreciated
property was distributed, and the corporate earnings were as much
as the fair market value of the property distributed, the cases held
that corporate earnings should be reduced by the fair market value
14T.D. 6152, note 4 supra. For other reasons supporting the Treasury
position see Peterson, supra note 4, 197-204.
11 S. Rep. No. 1941, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956).
16Jane Easton Bradley, 9 T.C. 115 (1947); Paulina Du Pont Dean,
9 T.C. 256 (1947); National Carbon Co., 2 T.C. 57 (1943).
17W. G. Maguire & Co., 20 T.C. 20 (1953); R. D. Merrill & Co., 4 T.C.
955 (1945).
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of the property distributed. 18 Although the cases, holding that the
earnings should be reduced by the fair market value of the appre-
ciated property, have been criticized, they seem sound.19 It is logi-
cally consistent to reduce earnings and profits to the extent that the
shareholder recognizes a taxable dividend since a dividend is ordi-
narily measured by the amount of earnings and profits distributed.20
Consequently, where the earnings and profits are $10,000 and the
property distributed has a basis of $5,000 and a fair market value
of $15,000, the shareholder should be required to report a dividend
of $10,000 and the corporate earnings should be reduced by the same
amount. Unfortunately this is not the law. The 1954 code has not
produced logical consistency in this area but it has removed doubt.
Neither the amount of the taxable dividend nor the fair market
value of the property distributed are the measure for reducing cor-
porate earnings. Section 312 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code provides that
the corporate earnings are to be reduced by the adjusted basis of
the property distributed, which is $5000 in the example given.
4. Basis of New Stock. Assuming that the shareholder is not
a corporation, the shareholder's basis for the stock received would
be its fair market value on the date of distribution. This result,
which was reached by judicial decision under the 1939 code,21 has
been expressly incorporated in the 1954 code.22 Thus, in the example
given, the shareholders' basis for the B corporation stock would be
$15,000.
5. Basis of Old Stock. Under both the 19392 and 195424 codes,
the shareholders' basis for the X corporation stock would be reduced
by that portion of the distribution which is not a dividend and to
the extent this non-dividend portion exceeds the adjusted basis
of the stock, it is treated as gain from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty. In the example given, if M and N each held half of the 200
outstanding shares of X corporation stock for which they paid $100
a share, their adjusted basis per share after the distribution would
be $75.00. $15,000 was distributed. $10,000 was a dividend and the
balance, $5,000, equally allocated over the 200 shares of X stock out-
standing reduces the basis of each share $25.00.
18 Cf. Estate of John H. Acheson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1242 (1944);
National Carbon Co., 2 T.C. 57, 61 (1943).
19 Raum, Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
610 (1950).
2 0 This assumes that Hirshon and Godley do not reflect the law.
21 John H. Cook, 38 B.T.A. 651 (1938).
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301(d) (1).
2326 C.F.R. 39.115(d)-1 (1953); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 115 (b), (d).
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301(c) (2), (3).
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing five tax consequences spotlight a significant
feature in the application of the 1954 Code to corporate distributions
of appreciated capital assets. The pattern lacks symmetry. At the
individual level the appreciation inhering in the distributed prop-
erty is fully recognized (though not necessarily forthwith), while
at the corporate level it is not recognized at all. The reason for this
dichotomy may be tradition more than anything else. The elim-
ination of tax at the corporate level results from Congress incor-
porating the Supreme Court's 1935 General Utilities Company de-
cision 25 into the 1954 Code.26 However, congressional continuation
of this traditional approach is, in reality, a concession to those who
view taxation of "earnings" at the corpbrate level and "dividends"
at the shareholder level as "double taxation" of the same income.2 7
This concession, like the dividend exclusion 2s and credit29 repre-
sents a basic policy decision. An examination of this and one other
policy decision may make the tax consequences of corporate dis-
tributions of inventory and depreciable property under Sections
311 and 312 of the 1954 Code more readily understandable. These
policy decisions are independently exemplified by Sections 337 and
341; consequently, a cursory but separate examination of those sec-
tions and their background seems appropriate.
A. MINIMN G THE "DOUBLE TAX"
Under the 1939 Code, stockholder dispositions of appreciated
asset corporations were fraught with uncertainties. The basic prin-
ciples were clear enough. On the one hand, if the appreciated
property were sold directly by the corporation and the proceeds of
the sale distributed to the stockholders as a liquidating dividend,
two taxes were ordinarily imposed; one, at the corporate level on
the gain from the sale of the appreciated assets, and another at the
stockholder level, on the shareholder's gain, if any, upon liquidation
of his stock. On the other hand, where the stockholders sold all
their stock directly to the purchaser, only a single tax would result
-a capital gains tax at the shareholder level. The obvious strategy
under the 1939 Code was to arrange a sale of the corporate stock
25296 U.S. 200 (1935).
26Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311(a).
27 See Paul, Taxation in the United States 422 (1954); Blough, The
Federal Taxing Process 314 (1952).
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 116.
29 Id. § 34.
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
by the stockholders in an effort to avoid the "double tax. '30 Or, at
least, that appeared to be the obvious strategy prior to Commis-
sioner v. Court Holding Company.31
In the Court Holding Company case the taxpayer corporation
negotiated for the sale of its sole asset, an appreciated apartment
house, to its lessee. An oral agreement relating to the terms and
conditions of the sale was reached by the taxpayer and lessee and
the following day the corporation distributed, by deed, the apart-
ment house to its stockholders as a liquidating dividend and there-
upon the stockholders executed a written agreement to sell to the
lessee upon substantially the same terms and conditions agreed upon
by the corporation. The purpose of the transaction was to eliminate
the "double tax" but the Commission assessed a deficiency in
an effort to enforce the "double tax" on the theory that the sale
was actually a sale to the lessee of corporate assets by the corpora-
tion and not distributed assets by the stockholders. The court
pointed out that "the incidence of taxation depends upon the sub-
stance of a transaction .... A sale by one person cannot be trans-
formed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter
as a conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature
of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist
solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective
administration of the tax policies of Congress."3 2
The Court Holding Company case put taxpayers on notice that
the Commissioner was entitled to look through a transaction to de-
termine whether there was, in substance, a sale by the corporation
rather than a liquidation and sale by the stockholders. However,
in the subsequent Cumberland Public Service Company case,33 the
Supreme Court made it clear that this is a question of fact and mere-
ly because the taxpayer may obtain a tax benefit by an anticipatory
liquidation does not, ipso facto, make the liquidation a sham. In
Cumberland the Supreme Court affirmed a finding by the Court
of Claims that the corporate liquidation was genuine and the sale
of the assets received in liquidation was made by the stockholders,
not the corporation.
To eliminate the consequences of the Court Holding Company
case, Congress enacted Section 337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code. In general, this section provides that no gain or loss is rec-
30 See Prisamt, Disposal of Appreciated Corporate Assets Together
with Corporate Shell, 34 Taxes 622 (1956).
31324 U.S. 331 (1945).
321d. at 334.
33 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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ognized to a corporation from the sale by it of property within a
12-month period beginning with the adoption of a plan of liquida-
tion if the plan is adopted after June 22, 1954, and provides for
complete liquidation and within such 12 month period all the
assets of the corporation (except assets retained to meet claims)
are distributed in complete liquidation.
Although the legislative history of Section 337 reveals that
its purpose was "to provide a definitive rule which [would] elim-
inate any uncertainty" presumably occasioned by the decisions in
Commissioner v. Court Holding Company, supra, and U.S. v. Cum-
berZand Public Service Co., supra,8 4 there is evidence that Congress
was concerned about the possibility that "double taxation" could
occur in such cases.35 Viewed in the light of its effect, Section 337
reflects not merely a congressional policy to achieve clarity but
more significantly a policy to eliminate the corporate "double tax"
in fringe areas. For, if the section is complied with, the tax at the
corporate level is wholly eliminated; and if the section is not com-
plied with, the taxpayer is exposed to the same Court Holding-Cum-
berland uncertainties that existed prior to adoption of the section.
The policy of eliminating the corporate double tax in fringe areas,
which seems so unmistakably the basis of Section 337, is also the
basis, albeit somewhat less obviously, of other sections of the code.3 6
It is submitted that this policy bears upon Section 311.
Admittedly, Section 311 merely echoes the long established and
well settled principle that a corporation does not recognize any in-
come when it distributes appreciated assets in kind; consequently
there is no tax at the corporate level on the appreciation. 37 How
then can it be suggested that Section 311 is part and parcel of a
discernible congressional trend to eliminate the corporate double
tax in fringe areas? The answer is simply this. In 1954, Congress
was faced with an incongruous tax pattern produced by the basic
conflict between the General Utilities case, where the appreciation
was not recognized in determining the corporate tax 38 and the Hir-
shon and Godley cases, where the appreciation was, in effect, rec-
34H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A28, A106 (1954); S. Rep.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241, 258 (1954).
35 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, supra note 34 at A106.
36Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 311, 312, 331, 333.
37 General Utilities & Operating Co. v Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
For a collection of cases following this decision see Molloy, Some Tax




ognized in determining corporate earnings and profits.39 In recon-
ciling this conflict Congress could have imposed the double tax by
Section 311 in at least two ways. It could have provided (1) that
a corporation would recognize gain upon the gratuitous distribution
of appreciated property in kind;40 or (2) that a corporate distribu-
tion of appreciated property would be treated as an anticipatory
assignment of income to the extent of the appreciation inhering in
the property.41 In the former situation the double tax would be
imposed at the time of distribution and in the latter situation it
would be imposed when the appreciation was realized by the
stockholder. No one is suggesting that Congress should have adopted
either course. But it is suggested that by studiously avoiding the
imposition of a tax at the corporate level in this area, and affirma-
tively eliminating it in other areas, 42 Congress was able to offer
additional appeasement to the critics of the "double tax." This
piecemeal appeasement, which is probably the only realistic ap-
proach in view of current fiscal needs, seems unfortunate, not only
because it complicates an already overly complicated revenue sys-
tem,43 but also because it fails to reach the heart of the matter.
Basically, the critics suggest that the present system of taxing
corporations is inequitable. Those who assert that the corporate
39 Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 861; Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862.
40 Congressional sanction of non-recognition in this area does not seem
to be constitutionally required because severance of "income" from "income
producing property" is no longer an essential prerequisite to realization.
See and compare Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) with Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). If a corporation "realizes" income when
it declares a dividend in cash and satisfies its obligation by distributing
appreciated property (Estate of Lewis Cass Ledyard, Jr., 44 B.T.A. 1056(1941); Callahan Road Improvement Co., 12 B.T.A. 1109 (1928)) a
corporation should also realize income when it declares and distributes
a dividend consisting of appreciated property. The substance and not the
form of the transaction should be controlling. Cf. United States v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955).
41U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.311(1) (a), 20 F.R. 8887 (Dec. 3, 1955), provides:
'"Where property is distributed by a corporation, which distribution is in
effect an anticipatory assignment of income, such income may be taxable
to the corporation." This regulation does not define when a corporate dis-
tribution of appreciated property will be treated as an anticipatory assign-
inent of income. For a discussion of the pre-1950 cases bearing on the prob-
lem, see Molloy, supra note 37, 60-69.42 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 337.
43 For a discussion of what complicates the system, see Cary, Pressure
Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing
Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 745 (1955).
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tax cannot be shifted to the consumer complain because it effects
an unjust progression in the rate of tax; and those who assert that
the corporate tax can be shifted to the consumer complain because
it effects an unjust regression in the rate of tax.44 In addition, the
critics contend that the present system discourages investment.4 5
Whatever merit there is to these criticisms, the remedy is not elim-
ination of the "double tax" in fringe areas. This adjustment is too
slight to either relieve inequities or encourage investment. 4
B. PREVENTING CONVERSION OF ORDINARY INCOME TO CAPITAL GAIN
The second policy decision deserving consideration evolves
from the congressional attitude toward conversion of ordinary in-
come to capital gain. No single factor has complicated the Revenue
Code more than the preferential treatment afforded capital gains.
Originally this special concession was justified on the ground that
it was unfair, in view of the progressive rates, to tax in a single
year gains accruing over several years.47 Under this rationale, only
gains resulting from the disposition of assets held by the taxpayer
for more than a year were entitled to special treatment. The mini-
mum holding period under the 1921 Revenue Act was two years48
and under the 1938 Revenue Act, eighteen months.4 9 However, in
1942, when Congress reduced the holding period to six months,50
it became apparent that alleviation of the tax burdens produced
when income earned in many years is realized in one is not the
sole, nor even primary, reason for the capital gains provisions.
Their real purpose is to encourage investment.51 Laudable as
this purpose may be, its legislative effectuation leaves something
to be desired.52 There are at least two basic deficiencies. First, the
statutorily required holding period is so brief it is, at best, doubtful
that the scheme can be realistically considered an incentive for "in-
44 See Slitor, The Corporate Income Tax: A Re-Evaluation, 5 Nat'l Tax J.
301 (1952).
45 See Shoup, The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code
of 1954, 8 Nat'l Tax J. 136 (1955).
40 The same is not true of the dividend exclusion or credit. Ibid.
47H. R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
4842 Stat. 233 (1921).
-9 52 Stat. 501 (1938).
0 56 Stat. 843 (1942).
51Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains
Taxation, 59 Yale L. J. 840 (1950).
52 Ibid.
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vestment" rather than "speculation."' 3 Secondly, the statutory speci-
fication of the income which is to receive preferential treatment
is not sufficiently delimited to produce the desired result. This
latter deficiency is the subject of present concern.
Broadly stated, the Revenue Code attempts to encourage in-
vestment by taxing at reduced rates capital increment or growth.
At the same time, earnings5 4 produced by capital or by personal
services are taxed at normal rates. To illustrate: the gain derived
from the sale or exchange of real estate held for investment more
than six months is taxed at a lower rate than the rents and profits
derived from the same real estate. In putting this master plan into
operation by the adoption of detailed and somewhat complex legis-
lative provisions, Congress, wittingly or unwittingly, left loopholes
enabling taxpayers to obtain for ordinary income the preferred
treatment of capital gains.5 Subsequent piecemeal attempts to close
these loopholes have not proven entirely successful.56 Section 341
relating to collapsible corporations represents the typical effort
to close the gap.
The primary object of this section is to frustrate taxpayers in
their attempts to convert ordinary income to capital gains by form-
ing and dissolving corporations. Consider the typical situation. A
taxpayer, who is in the contracting business, forms a corporation
for the purpose of constructing and selling an apartment building.
The taxpayer contributes sufficient capital to the corporation to
cover the cost of the development, and in return receives all of the
corporate stock. The incorporation is tax free57 and the taxpayer's
basis for his stock is the cost of the development. 58 Upon comple-
tion, if the corporation sold the project, the profit would be ordinary
income subject to the corporate tax;50 and if distributed as a divi-
53 The drafters of the A.L.I. Federal Income Tax Statute recommended
elimination of the holding period altogether because "the policy justifica-
tion for a holding period of only six months duration is too weak to
justify the complexity" it creates. Surrey and Warren, The Income Tax
Project of the American Law Institute, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 810 (1953);
A.L.I. Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X227 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
54 1n the sense used the term "earnings" is not intended to encompass
realized increases in the value of an asset held for investment purposes.
55Paul, Taxation in the United States 679 (1954).
5 6Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Be-
fore and Under the 1954 Code, 64 Yale L.J. 1 (1954).
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351(a).
5SId. § 358(a).
59 See Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 190
F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
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dend the profit would again be subject to tax at the shareholder
level.60 Prior to 1950, the taxpayer could have converted the double
tax at ordinary income rates to a single tax at capital gain rates
by liquidating the corporation prior to realization of the project
profit. Upon liquidation the taxpayer would have recognized a
long term capital gain (assuming that he has held his stock for
more than six months) equal to the difference between the cost of
his stock and the fair market value of the project at the time of
liquidation. If the project is then sold by the taxpayer for its
fair market value, no gain is realized because the project has a
tax basis in taxpayer's hands equal to the fair market value at the
time of liquidation."' In 1950, to prevent conversion of ordinary in-
come to capital gains in situations similar to the one described,62
Congress enacted Section 117 (m) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. This section, as improved by Congress in 195163 and 1954, be-
came Section 341 of the 1954 Code.
In general, Section 341 (b) defines a "collapsible corporation"
as a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufac-
ture, construction, or production of property, or for the purchase
of inventory, stock in trade,64 unrealized receivables or fees repre-
senting income items65 or certain property used in trade or busi-
ness66 with a view to realization by its shareholders of gain attrib-
utable to the property by a sale or exchange of stock (in liquida-
tion or otherwise) or by a distribution prior to realization by the
corporation of a substantial portion of the taxable income to be
derived from the property. The gain from the sale or exchange of
60Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301(c), 316(a).
61 For an excellent discussion of the problem, see DeWind and Anthoine,
Collapsible Corporations, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 475 (1956).62 H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96-99 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88-91 (1950).
6365 Stat. 502 (1951).
64 Including specifically "(A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of
the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable year; (B) and property
held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of its trade or business. .. " Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 341 (b) (3)
(A), (B).
65 Including specifically "unrealized receivable or fees, except receivables
from sales of property" described in § 341(b) (3). Id. § 341(b) (3) (C).
WOIncluding specifically 'property described in Section 1231(b) (with-
out regard to any holding period therein provided), except such property
which is or has been used in connection with the manufacture, construc-
tion, production or sale of property described in .. . (Section 341(b) (3)
(A) or (B)." Id. § 341 (b) (3) (D).
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collapsible corporation stock, or from a capital or liquidating dis-
tribution by a collapsible corporation is, subject to certain limita-
tions,' 7 treated as gain from the sale or exchange of a non-capital
asset.68 Thus, when a corporation is collapsed, the appreciation in-
hering in property produced for sale and distributed to the stock-
holders in kind is taxed to the stockholders as ordinary income.
It is interesting to note that by using a collapsible corporation, a
taxpayer can avoid the corporate double tax, but cannot convert
ordinary income to capital gains.6 9 An analysis of Section 341 dem-
onstrates a definite congressional trend to prevent, insofar as pos-
sible, tax avoidance by conversion of ordinary income to capital
gains. This trend has also had its impact on Section 312. The ex-
tent of the impact can be adequately demonstrated by a minor
variation in the original hypothetical situation.
III. DISTRIBUTION OF INVENTORY
If the X corporation, having current and accumulated earnings
of $10,000, had distributed to its shareholders 200 LIFO inventory
items having a fair market value of $15,000, instead of the B corpora-
tion stock, the five-fold tax consequences would have been different
in the following respects:
1. Effect on Corporate Income. By distributing LIFO inventory
the X corporation may realize income. Section 311 (b) provides
that a corporation distributing LIFO inventory recognizes gain to
the extent that the LIFO value of the inventory distributed is ex-
ceeded by the value of the inventory distributed, computed under
67 Id. § 341(d), provides that the collapsible corporation treatment shall
not apply in the case of gain realized by a shareholder with respect to
his collapsible corporation stock-"(1) unless, at any time after the
commencement of the manufacture, construction or production of the
property, or at the time of the purchase of the property described in sub-
section (b) (3) or at any time thereafter, such shareholder (A) owned (or
was considered as owning) more than 5 per cent in value of the outstanding
stock of the corporation....
"(2) to the gain recognized during a taxable year unless more than 70 per
cent of such gain is attributable to the property so manufactured, con-
structed, produced or purchased; and
"(3) to gain realized after the expiration of 3 years following the com-
pletion of such manufacture, construction, production or purchase."
68 Id. § 341(a).
09 Except as provided in Section 341(d), text supra note 67.
70 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 472.
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section 47171 using the "retail method"72 of valuing inventories, if
the corporation uses that method and, if not, using the "cost or
market, whichever is lower" 73 method.74 Assume that using the
LIFO method, the value of X corporation's inventory before the
distribution is $20,000 and after the distribution, $11,000. The LIFO
basis of the inventory distributed is $9,000. Assume also that X
corporation does not use the retail method of valuing inventories,
and the value of its inventory using "cost or market, whichever
is lower" for each item is $24,000 before the distribution and $12,000
after the distribution. The "cost or market" basis of the inventory
distributed is $12,000. Since this exceeds the LIFO basis of the
inventory distributed by $3,000, the corporation recognizes ordinary
income to that extent.75 The object of section 311 (b) is to insure
that the amount of tax previously deferred under the LIFO method
of accounting will be paid by the corporation if inventory is dis-
tributed in kind to the shareholders.76
2. Effect on Corporate Earnings and Profits. When a corpora-
tion makes a distribution, not in liquidation or redemption, of in-
ventory to its shareholders, the corporate earnings and profits are
increased to the extent that the fair market value of the inventory
distributed exceeds its basis, and are decreased by the fair market
value of the inventory distributed, or the amount of the earnings
and profits (including the inventory appreciation), whichever is
lower.77 If the X corporation, having $10,000 current and accumu-
lated earnings and profits, distributed inventory having a fair mar-
ket value of $15,000 and a basis7 8 of $9,000, the corporate earnings
and profits after the distribution would be $1,000 ($10,000 + 6,000
- 15,000). Where LIFO inventory is distributed an adjustment
must be made for any gain to the corporation under Section 311 (b) .79
In the hypothetical situation, if the X corporation distributed LIFO
71 Id. § 471 provides: '"Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary or his
delegate the use of inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the
income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such
basis as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe as conforming as
nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business
and as most clearly reflecting income."
72See 26 C.F.R. 39.22(c)-4 (1953). The retail price method may be
adapted to conform to principles of LIFO. 26 C.F.R. 39.22(d)-i (1953).
73 See 26 C.F.R. 39.22(c)-4 (1953).
74 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311.
75 See the example in § 1.311-1 (c), 20 F.R. 8887 (Dec. 3, 1955).
76 See S. Rep. No. 1941, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1956).
77 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 312(b).
78 Id. § 1013.
79 Id. § 312(c) (3).
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inventory and recognized a gain of $3,000 under Section 311 (b), the
corporate earnings should not be increased $3,000, the extent of
recognition under Section 311 (b), and also $6,000, the difference
between fair market value and basis of the inventory distributed
under Section 312 (b), because the $6,000 increase in corporate earn-
ings required by Section 312 (b) necessarily includes the $3,000 rec-
ognized gain under Section 311 (a). Being aware of this, the Senate
Finance Committee amended the House version of Section 312 by
providing that in the application of that section proper adjustment
should be made for any gain to the corporation under Section
311 (b).180 The amendment did not provide any specific rules for
the adjustment because the Senate Finance Committee considered
"it appropriate that the rules be supplied by regulations." 81 The
final regulations relating to Section 312 deal with this problem
simply by an illustration which indicates that, in computing the
increase in corporate earnings required by Section 312 (b), the basis
of the inventory should be increased by the amount of gain recog-
nized under Section 311 (b) .82
The distribution in the hypothetical situation would alter cor-
porate earnings in the following manner.
Corporate earnings prior to distribution ........................................ 10,000
Increases
Sec. 311 (b) gain ............................................................... 3,000
Sec. 312 (b) adjustment
Fair market value of inventory dist ......... 15,000
Basis ....................................... 9,000
Sec. 311 (b) gain ...................... 3,000
12,000
3,000
es ........................................................................Total increase 6,000
16,000
Decreases
Fair market value of inventory dist -......----- 15,000
Earnings and Profits .......................................... 16,000
Lesser ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15,000
Corporate earnings after distribution .............................................. 1,000
80 Compare H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1954), with Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 312. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1954).
81 S. Rep. No. 1622, ibid.
82 § 1.312-4, Example 3, 20 F.R. 8889 (Dec. 3, 1955).
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3. The Extent of the Dividend. The purpose of Section 312 (b)
is to insure that when appreciated inventory is distributed to share-
holders the earnings and profits will reflect the appreciation in
value for the purpose of determining the amount taxable to the
shareholder as a dividend.8 3 When a corporation, with $10,000 cur-
rent and accumulated earnings, distributes inventory having a basis
of $9,000 and a fair market value of $15,000 the shareholders recog-
nize a $15,000 taxable dividend. At the instant of distribution the
earnings and profits become $16,000, and the $15,000 distribution,
which reduces these earnings to $1,000, is wholly taxable as a divi-
dend.8 4 Thus, with respect to distributions of appreciated inven-
tory, the 1954 code does not reject, but retains, the Hirshon-Godley
rationale.
4. Distributee's Basis for the Inventory. Assuming that the
shareholder is not a corporation, the shareholder's basis for the
inventory items received is their fair market value on the date
of distribution.85
5. Distributee's Basis for His Stock. Since in the hypothetical
situation, the inventory distribution was wholly taxable as a divi-
dend, the shareholder's basis for his X corporation stock would not
be affected.8 6
The statutory crazy quilt which covers corporate distributions
of appreciated inventory is not without a discernible pattern. The
real appreciation, as distinguished from the fictional appreciation
produced by LIFO, escapes the corporate, but not the individual
tax. The statutory scheme is effectuated by the application of a
double standard at the corporate level. Real appreciation inhering
in the inventory is not recognized in determining corporate "in-
come" subject to tax, but is recognized in determining corporate
"earnings" available for dividends. This insures that when received
at the shareholder level, the appreciation inhering in the inventory
will be taxed as ordinary income, and not as a capital gain.
IV. DISTRIBUTIONS OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY
With the passing of Hirshon and Godley, maximum tax benefits
will probably be obtained when the corporation distributes depreci-
able property. Consider the tax consequences of the following
transaction:
83H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A95 (1954).
84 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 301, 312(b), 316.
85 Id. § 301(d) (1).
s6 Id. § 301(c) (2).
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An investor, who has substantial construction company hold-
ings, forms an excavating corporation to dig basements for a low
rent housing project. For a $500,000 investment, he receives all the
stock, which in his hands is a capital asset 7 with a basis equal to
his investment.88 The corporation retains $100,000 for operating
expenses and uses the balance of its capital to purchase drag lines,
excavators, bulldozers and other depreciable equipment. Each item
of this new equipment has a useful life of approximately eight
years.8 9
Under the liberal depreciation provisions of the 1954 code, the
corporation would be entitled to a very substantial deduction from
gross income each year. Under the long used straight line method
of depreciation the corporation could deduct only 12'k% of the
equipment's cost annually until it had been fully recovered.00 Under
the new declining balance method of depreciation, however, the
corporation could deduct 25% of the cost of the equipment the first
year, and 25% of the unrecovered cost remaining at the beginning
of the year, each year thereafter.9 1 Thus the corporation would be
entitled to a $100,000 deduction the first year, a $75,000 deduction
the second year, a $56,250 deduction the third year, and so on.92
The corporation could also take a deduction for a reasonable
salary paid to its sole stockholder for services as president. 3 If
the corporation has gross income of $100,000 annually, pays its
president a salary of $20,000, and adopts the declining balance
method of depreciation, the corporate income, tax,94 and accumu-
87 Id. § 1221. The taxpayer is not a dealer.
8sId. § 358(a).
89 This average figure was taken to simplify the illustration. Actually,
the average useful life of a drag line is 5 to 12 years, an excavator 4 to
10 years, and a bulldozer 4 to 8 years. Bureau Bulletin 'IF", 2 P-H 1957
Fed. Tax Serv. Para. 14,161-F.
90 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b) (1); T.D. 6182, §1.167(b) (1), 21 F.R.
3989 (June 12, 1956).
91 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b) (2); T.D. 6182, § 1.167 (b) (2), 21 F.R.
3990 (June 12, 1956).
92 The code also authorizes use of the sum of the years-digits method
of computing depreciation. Under this method the annual deduction would
be greater than the straight line method deduction and less than the de-
clining balance method during the early years. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
167(b) (3); T.D. 6182, § 1.167(b)-3, 21 F.R. 3991 (June 12, 1956).
93 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (1).
94 Id. § 11. This assumed that the normal tax rates would be reduced as
scheduled, April 1, 1957. But see Tax Rate Extension Act, 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-12, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1957).
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lated earnings for the first three years of operation would be that
indicated on the following chart:
Year Gross Stockholder's Depre- Taxable Tax Accumulated
Income Salary ciation Income Earnings
1957 100,000 20,000 100,000 (20,000) ........ ........
1958 100,000 20,000 75,000 (15,000) ........ ........
1959 100,000 20,000 56,250 8,750 2,187.50 6,562.50
Total 300,000 60,000 231,250 8,750 2,187.50 6,562.50
At the conclusion of the third year the corporation's depreciable
property will have an unrecovered basis of $168,750. Assume that
its fair market value at that time is $210,000. Lest this latter assump-
tion be considered unrealistic, it should be mentioned in passing
that more than 57% of the cost of this property has been recovered,
taxwise, during less than 38% of its useful life; consequently it
seems reasonable to assume, especially during an inflationary pe-
riod, that at the end of the third year the tax basis of the property
would be less than its market value.
If the corporation were to sell the depreciable property and
distribute the proceeds to its sole stockholder, the tax consequences
would be these: the corporation would recognize a $41,250 long
term capital gain95 subject to a 25% tax;96 the corporate earnings
and profits of $6,562.50 would be increased by $30,937.50; 97 $37,500
of the proceeds distributed to the sole stockholder would be a divi-
dend,s taxable at ordinary income tax rates; and $162,187.50 the
balance of the proceeds, though tax free, would reduce the stock-
holder's basis for his stock.9 9 Only a single facet of this transaction
could have afforded any tax benefit. By using the declining balance
method, the corporation obtained a depreciation deduction which
exceeded actual depreciation by $41,250. This reduced real income
$41,250, and created a fictional increment of the same amount in
the depreciable property. Thus, at the corporate level ordinary
income was converted to capital gain. However, the tax benefit
was nihil. The $41,250 was earned ratably during 1957, 1958, and
1959, and if it had been reported as ordinary income during this
period the taxable income for each of the years would not have
exceeded $25,000. Under these circumstances the rate differential,
95 Id. § 1231. This assumes that there are no § 1231 losses.
90 Id. § 1201 (a)(2).
97The recognized gain ($41,250) minus the tax ($10,312.50).
PsInt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301(b) (1) (A), 316(a).
09 The amount realized ($210,000) minus the tax ($10,312.50), was avail-
able for distribution. Thus $199,687.50 minus the dividend $37,500 re-
duces the stockholder's basis. Id. § 301(c).
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at the corporate level, between ordinary income and capital gains
is 0.100 Before 1957 it was only 5%. At the individual level the rate
differential would be at least 50%.11 The moral of the story is this:
by altering the transaction slightly the taxpayer could have obtained
the greater rate differential and also have avoided the corporate
double tax.
In the hypothetical situation, the corporation could have dis-
tributed the depreciable property as a dividend in kind without in-
curring any tax at the corporate level;1°2 and only $6,562.50 would
be a dividend taxable at the individual level.1 3 This latter result
reflects the impact of Section 312; corporate earnings and profits
are not increased by the amount of appreciation inhering in the
property distributed. Under the Hirshon-Godley approach the divi-
dend would have been $41,250 more; thus, the $41,250 which, through
liberal depreciation deductions, had been converted from ordinary
income to capital increment at the corporate level, would have been
converted back to ordinary income at the individual level.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the impression that may have been created by the
last illustration, the Section 312 approach is sound. It may seem
unfortunate that at the same time liberal depreciation rates were
on their way in, Hirshon and Godley were on their way out. But
if, as suggested in the illustration, ordinary income can be converted
to capital gain by excessive depreciation deductions, the fault, if
any, lies in Section 167, not 312.
The problem would be quite different if the conversion from
ordinary income to capital gain were effectuated by the corporate
distribution, e.g., where an inventory item in the hands of the cor-
poration upon distribution would become a capital asset in the
hands of the stockholder. However, Section 312 adequately guards
against this possibility by requiring that at the time of the distri-
bution corporate earnings and profits be increased by the amount
of appreciation inhering in any inventory, property held primarily
100 Compare Id. § 1201 (a) (2), with Id. § 11. As a result of the Tax Rate
Extension Act, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-12, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1957)
(passed after this article was written), the differential will not be 0 until
July 1, 1958.
101 Id. § 1202.
102 Id. § 311(a).
103 The collapsible corporation provisions do not apply to this transac-
tion because the property distributed has been held three years by the
corporation. Id. § 341(d) (3).
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for resale, fees, or unrealized receivables (to the extent not previ-
ously includible in income), which are distributed as a dividend.
Consequently, within its own sphere of influence, Section 312 offers
very little opportunity for tax evasion.
The tax benefits derived from corporate distributions of appre-
ciated property in kind flow primarily from the non-recognition
provisions of Section 311. Non-recognition of the appreciation at
the corporate level may be justifiable on the theory that the appre-
ciation is not realized, in a true sense, at the time of the distribution.
There is merely a change in the form of ownership. While Congress
is not constitutionally bound to follow this traditional line of rea-
soning, there is little likelihood that it will be abandoned in view
of the trend to reduce, rather than increase, the area in which the
burdensome impact of the corporate "double tax" is felt.
